Security tools for everyday use. The category holds one tool, the password strength tester, and it earns its place by doing something most strength meters get wrong: it shows you the arithmetic instead of a coloured bar. A bar tells you a password is "strong"; the arithmetic tells you why, which is the only part you can act on when the bar and your judgement disagree. The tester calculates the entropy of a candidate password and converts that into an estimated crack time under several attack models, including an offline dictionary attack against a hashed database and a purely random guessing attack. Those two numbers differ enormously for the same password, which is why a meter that reports a single figure is quietly choosing one of them for you. A password like 'Tr0ub4dor&3' looks stronger than it is against a dictionary attack and far weaker than it looks against random guessing; the tester shows both, so you can see which threat you are actually exposed to. Entropy is measured in bits and comes from the size of the space the password could have come from: how many characters, drawn from how many possible characters, and how much the pattern reduced the odds. What the tester is careful not to do is treat a string of lowercase letters and a string of symbols as equally random. Length is the dominant term, so four random words beat fourteen mangled characters, and a long passphrase survives a dictionary attack that a short complex password does not. Where a password contains a word, a name, a year, or the sequence 'qwerty', that structure lowers the effective entropy and the tester reflects it rather than rewarding the punctuation you added to disguise it. Three things a strength meter cannot tell you, and it is worth being explicit about them because they are where the real risk lives. It cannot tell you whether the password has already appeared in a breach — that requires checking a curated list of leaked credentials, which is a different tool and a different data source. It cannot tell you whether the same password is used on your email, which is the account most worth protecting, because no meter can see your other accounts. And it cannot tell you whether the password is unique to this one site, which matters because password reuse is the mechanism that turns one breach into several. A meter is a statement about a string, not about the account that string unlocks. The practical reading of the result is narrower than the number suggests. If the tester reports a crack time in the years against a dictionary attack, the password is strong enough that guessing it is not the cheapest way in — and then the next control matters more than another symbol: a unique password for this service, stored in a password manager, with two-factor authentication switched on. If it reports minutes, the fix is length, not complexity. Add words, not punctuation. A passphrase of five or six unrelated words is easier to remember, easier to type on a phone, and far harder to crack than 'P@ssw0rd!2024', which is in every cracking dictionary ever built. This is the check that a security review actually asks for. Not "is there a symbol" but "is it long, is it unique to this service, and is there a second factor behind it". The password strength guide that accompanies this tool covers the maths in more depth — how the entropy figure is derived, why it is an estimate rather than a guarantee, and what the different attack models assume. Read it before you write a policy for a team, because the difference between a password policy that survives an audit and one that merely looks strict is usually length, not symbols. For generating a password in the first place, the password generator is in the Utility category rather than here, and it is worth using rather than inventing one yourself: humans asked to invent a password repeatedly reuse structure, and a generator draws from a cryptographic source. All Security tools process data locally — your candidate password never leaves your device, and the tester reports no results to a server or a log. The other half of a password policy is the part a strength meter cannot touch, and it is where most of the risk actually sits. Three controls do most of the work, and all three are cheap. The first is uniqueness: a password manager generates and stores a different password for every service, which removes reuse as an attack path entirely and makes the question of which passwords to remember go away. The second is length, which as established is the dominant term, and the cheapest length is a passphrase of several unrelated words. The third is a second factor, which changes the arithmetic completely: a password that survives a year of offline guessing is beside the point when the attacker also needs a code from your phone. The controls that often get proposed instead are the ones that do least. Forced symbol substitutions produce passwords like 'P@ssw0rd!' — a predictable shape, in every cracking dictionary, and the substitution is guessable because it is systematic. Expiry rules force people to change a password that has not been compromised, which produces a small set of variations of one password that has been compromised, and history-based checks of the last ten do nothing about the other forty. A complexity rule measured against a dictionary rather than a character set catches the real failures: 'Password1!' passes most complexity rules and fails every dictionary. The account-password advice that survives contact with reality is longer, unique, generated, and behind a second factor — and the tools on this page support all four except the last one, which is a setting on the service rather than a thing a tool can do for you.
Get embed code for the JWT Decoder — let visitors inspect JWT tokens on your site.
Get embed code for the Password Generator — strong passwords for your users on your site.
Get embed code for the Password Strength Tester — entropy/crack-time for your sign-up form.
Test password strength with entropy calculation and crack time estimates. Get recommendations for stronger passwords.